共同基金的公司治理---由基金交叉補貼及費用來看
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2010/08-2011/07
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過去文獻已探討同一基金家族、或同一基金經理人所管理的各基金間之交叉補貼現象 (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2006; Chen, Lai, and Tsai, 2009)，亦即以對基金家族或基金經 理人具有較低價值之基金，來補貼其具有較高價值之基金，使後者能有好的報酬表現。 因此，基金家族之隸屬或同時管理不同之基金，可能使基金經理人犧牲部份基金股東之 權益，以使得全基金家族或該基金經理人獲利。這種在同一基金家族、或同一基金經理 人所管理的各基金中，偏好某些特別基金的情況，可能造成基金管理公司和股東之間的 利害衝突，尤其是對補貼者而言。本研究計劃第一個研究主題即要探討基金的公司治理 與(1)同一基金家族之交叉補貼(2)同一基金經理人所管理的各基金間之交叉補貼的關 係。第二個研究主題 共同基金之投資人對基金報酬表現有不同的敏感性。比較不富經驗之投資者可能易受 廣告等的影響，而反而對每天變動的基金報酬情況無法掌握或反應。在這樣的情況下， 基金家族或基金經理人可能願意花比較高的行銷費用來推銷基金(包括申購手續費及 年度營運費用中之12b-1 費用)，使得基金的能見度提高，進而增加基金的淨現金流入 及資產規模，即使扣除費用後的基金報酬率因而下降，但基金並不見得會有大量現金 流出。但在同時，基金家族或基金經理人仍要考量投資人期望基金之報酬表現能符合 其費用，尤其當該基金有較好的公司治理時。因此，本研究計劃第二個研究主題即同 時考量基金費用、基金報酬、基金的淨現金流入之間可能之相互關係及內生性，及基 金的公司治理，以期能更完整地來考量基金費用的決策過程。
First Issue Previous studies have documented cross-fund subsidization within fund families or channeled through the same fund managers, where funds with high value to family or to managers outperform at the expense of funds with low value to family or to managers (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2006; Chen, Lai, and Tsai, 2009). Therefore, family affiliation or concurrent management across funds may induce managers to sacrifice the interests of fund shareholders if the overall family or if the total assets under concurrent management stand to benefit. The “favoritism” or preference within fund families or within managers will result in the divergence of interests between fund management companies and shareholders, especially for those funds subsidizing other affiliated funds. Thus, the first issue of the current proposal is going to examine the relation between board structure and (a) cross-fund subsidization channeled through fund family, and (b) cross-fund subsidization channeled through same fund managers.Second Issue Mutual fund investors have different performance sensitivity. Unsophisticated investors may be more responsive to advertising and be less sensitive to everyday volatile fund return. To take advantage of it, fund families/ fund managers may incur higher marketing fees (including loads and 12b-1 fees in annual expense ratio) in order to increase the visibility of funds, and thus expect to increase money inflows into funds and the resulting assets under management, even the after-fees performance will then be lower. But the reduction in after-fee performance caused by increase in fees may not result in a large money outflows. Alternatively, fund families/ fund managers still need to consider bringing fees more in line with performance, especially when a fund has better governance structure. As a result, one needs to consider the endogeneity of fund fees, return performance, and inflows as well as the governance structure in order to understand the decision-making process of fees setting in a more complete manner. This is the focus of the second issue of the current proposal.
First Issue Previous studies have documented cross-fund subsidization within fund families or channeled through the same fund managers, where funds with high value to family or to managers outperform at the expense of funds with low value to family or to managers (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2006; Chen, Lai, and Tsai, 2009). Therefore, family affiliation or concurrent management across funds may induce managers to sacrifice the interests of fund shareholders if the overall family or if the total assets under concurrent management stand to benefit. The “favoritism” or preference within fund families or within managers will result in the divergence of interests between fund management companies and shareholders, especially for those funds subsidizing other affiliated funds. Thus, the first issue of the current proposal is going to examine the relation between board structure and (a) cross-fund subsidization channeled through fund family, and (b) cross-fund subsidization channeled through same fund managers.Second Issue Mutual fund investors have different performance sensitivity. Unsophisticated investors may be more responsive to advertising and be less sensitive to everyday volatile fund return. To take advantage of it, fund families/ fund managers may incur higher marketing fees (including loads and 12b-1 fees in annual expense ratio) in order to increase the visibility of funds, and thus expect to increase money inflows into funds and the resulting assets under management, even the after-fees performance will then be lower. But the reduction in after-fee performance caused by increase in fees may not result in a large money outflows. Alternatively, fund families/ fund managers still need to consider bringing fees more in line with performance, especially when a fund has better governance structure. As a result, one needs to consider the endogeneity of fund fees, return performance, and inflows as well as the governance structure in order to understand the decision-making process of fees setting in a more complete manner. This is the focus of the second issue of the current proposal.