股吧投資專家對裁決性盈餘管理影響之探究
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2023
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近年來,中國的網路投資平台(以下簡稱:股吧)崛起,投資人可以在股吧表達意見,並與其他投資人互動。當具有影響力的股吧投資專家開始追蹤公司時,其意見引起其他投資人關注。具有影響力的股吧投資專家對所追蹤公司可能具有監督作用,因而影響經理人員進行裁決性盈餘管理誘因。本論文目的係檢視當具有影響力股吧投資專家首次追蹤公司,公司經理人員盈餘管理行為是否有所改變。此外,本論文分別以機構投資人持股比例和獲利能力做為調節變數,檢視具有影響力股吧投資專家首次追蹤公司對公司盈餘管理行為之影響是否有所改變。本研究以2017年至2021年東方財富網股吧投資人所追蹤的A股上市公司為樣本,實證結果顯示,當具有影響力的股吧投資專家首次追蹤公司後,並未對裁決性盈餘管理行為產生顯著影響。實證結果亦顯示,當具有影響力的股吧投資專家開始追蹤,機構投資人持股比高或獲利能力高的公司,公司裁決性盈餘管理程度則會顯著下降。額外分析結果顯示,當具有影響力股吧投資專家首次追蹤公司,該公司經理人員會傾向採用營業外收入和支出來操縱盈餘。
In recent years, with the rise of online investment platforms (hereafter Gub) in China, investors can express their opinions and interact with others at Gub. When influential Gub's investment experts start to follow a company for the first time, their opinions attract the attention of other investors. The incentives of firms' managers to engage in discretionary accrual earnings management may be affected because influential Gub's investment experts may have monitoring effects on the company. This study aims to examine whether managers' discretionary accrual earnings management behavior will change after influential Gub's investment experts start to follow a company on Gub. Furthermore, this study uses institutional investors' shareholding and firms' profitability as mediators. It examines whether the impact on managers' discretionary accrual earnings management by influential Gub's investment experts is changed by two mediators. This study takes A-share stocks followed by investors on Gub from 2017 to 2021 as the sample. The empirical results show that after influential Gub's investment experts start to follow a company on Gub, there is no significant effect on the magnitude of discretionary accrual earnings management. The empirical results also indicate that the magnitude of discretionary accrual earnings management significantly decreases when influential Gub's investment experts start to follow a company with high institutional investors' shareholding or high profitability. In the additional tests, the empirical results show that managers manipulate earnings through non-operating income and expenses after influential Gub's investment experts start to follow a company on Gub.
In recent years, with the rise of online investment platforms (hereafter Gub) in China, investors can express their opinions and interact with others at Gub. When influential Gub's investment experts start to follow a company for the first time, their opinions attract the attention of other investors. The incentives of firms' managers to engage in discretionary accrual earnings management may be affected because influential Gub's investment experts may have monitoring effects on the company. This study aims to examine whether managers' discretionary accrual earnings management behavior will change after influential Gub's investment experts start to follow a company on Gub. Furthermore, this study uses institutional investors' shareholding and firms' profitability as mediators. It examines whether the impact on managers' discretionary accrual earnings management by influential Gub's investment experts is changed by two mediators. This study takes A-share stocks followed by investors on Gub from 2017 to 2021 as the sample. The empirical results show that after influential Gub's investment experts start to follow a company on Gub, there is no significant effect on the magnitude of discretionary accrual earnings management. The empirical results also indicate that the magnitude of discretionary accrual earnings management significantly decreases when influential Gub's investment experts start to follow a company with high institutional investors' shareholding or high profitability. In the additional tests, the empirical results show that managers manipulate earnings through non-operating income and expenses after influential Gub's investment experts start to follow a company on Gub.
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股吧, 具有影響力投資專家, 裁決性盈餘管理, 機構投資人持股, 獲利能力, Gub, Influential investment experts, Discretionary accrual earnings management, Institutional investors' shareholding, Profitability