與他者之臉的倫理邂逅:勞倫斯小說中的語言,愛與性差異

Abstract

某些當代（後結構）思想家，主張以無可化約於「同一」的差異性，來重新思考倫理問題，其中勒維納斯所提出的「絕對他者性」概念，更有助於我們重新審視勞倫斯在他小說中常提到的「他者的不可翻譯性」。本論文從這些思想家的觀點出發——以勒維納斯為主，兼及德希達、尼采、傅柯、布朗修和若干位法國女性主義學者——試圖以勞倫斯的小說提供一種對倫理的閱讀，並以倫理來閱讀其小說。勒維納斯曾以「臉與臉的邂逅」這一意象來表示自我與他者非對稱性的倫理關係。在這邂逅中，自我與他者並不以平等互惠的關係存在，因為「他者之臉」的顯現，對自我來說，是一份獨特且不能化約的禮物。德希達針對勒維納斯的觀點提出最根本性的質疑——也就是，在「臉與臉的邂逅」中，他者如何能顯現，而自我又如何能關懷他者？本論文以德希達、勒維納斯及其他思想家的對話為背景，探討勞倫斯小說中的三大議題——語言、愛及性差異。勞倫斯對這三大議題的處理，相當程度反映他對他者性的思考及重視，也因此藉由對這三大議題的探討，我們可以再度省思「絕對他者性」及「他者的不可翻譯性」等概念對於倫理學的貢獻及其潛藏的危險。 在第一部份，筆者根據解構主義在最近的倫理轉向中所提出的觀點——也就是，語言本身浮動不定的指涉性，非但沒有削弱，反而強化了語言的倫理功能——來檢視勞倫斯的語言表現對我們重新思考倫理問題的貢獻。藉由分析勞倫斯小說中語言的複雜性可以說明，勞倫斯的小說在提供倫理價值的同時，也在語言的他者性中揭露倫理的虛構特質。在此雙重驅力下，文學文本的「指涉」及「非指涉」力量，乃處於互動的創造性關係中。在第二部分，筆者藉由與勒維納斯的比較來耙梳勞倫斯對愛的觀點，尤其是他所提出的「如星之平衡」這一概念，這是一種植基於「絕對他者性」的愛所建立的倫理關係。但是，任何與「絕對他者」之間的倫理關係，本身就是一種矛盾。著眼於此，筆者試圖證明，在他的小說中，勞倫斯並未視他自己所提的「如星之平衡」為愛的理想結構，而是一種隱含高度爭議的可能性。在第三部份，筆者以勒維納斯與一些女性主義學者的對話，兼及某些後結構思想家所提的倫理／政治的辯證關係，來探討勞倫斯小說中的性差異問題。雖然勞倫斯認為性別不同的個體是無從比較的，但在閱讀其小說的過程中可發現，性差異對勞倫斯而言，並不是一道無可跨越的鴻溝，而是可用來豐富性別存在的資產，更是追求性別正義的基石。 「絕對他者性」這一概念所隱含的倫理觀可啟發我們對勞倫斯小說的倫理閱讀，但勞倫斯小說更可做為此一概念的批判。因此，本論文既不是以某些現成理論來套用在勞倫斯小說上，更不是隨意臚列若干文學例子以證明某些理論的適用性。事實上，勞倫斯所倡言的「他者的不可翻譯性」與後現代的他者性存在極大的差異。勞倫斯的思想當然不能歸屬於後現代倫理觀，因為他從不曾像勒維納斯那樣賦予他者絕對的優先權。勞倫斯關注的重點是如何透過與絕對他者的邂逅來豐富自我，而勒維納斯堅持的是自我對他者所背負的永不可懈怠的責任。透過這些思想家的對話來閱讀勞倫斯的小說，讓我們體認到：即使最圓滿牢固的自我，在面對他者時，也不可能完全抹去其差異性；即使最謙卑、耐心守候的自我，在關懷他者時，也總必須以自主的自我來顯現；即使最細心傾聽的閱讀，在詮釋文學文本時，也總必須把它化約為一種可以理解的知識。。儘管如此，勞倫斯與這些思想家對自我意識及智性知識的批判以及對「可能性」與「不可能性」的思考，使我們在智性文化及無可避免的「互為主體性」暴力關係中，得以瞥見一道倫理的出口與靈光。

This study is an ethical reading of D. H. Lawrence’s fiction in the light of some thinkers—with more emphasis on Emmanuel Levinas, and also with reference to Jacque Derrida, Fredrick Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Maurice Blanchot, and some French feminists— who have contributed to a re-thinking of ethical questions by focusing on our relation to an unsubsumable Other which is beyond the economy of the Same. Levinas’s concept of “absolute alterity” especially serves to inspire a re-vision of Lawrence’s repeated emphasis on “untranslatable otherness” in his work—a notion made more popular by poststructuralist theory. Levinas designates the ethical relation to the other as a face-to-face encounter, in which the self and the other do not exchange reciprocally because the face of the other manifests itself as a singular and irreducible gift. But a decisive question has been raised by Derrida in his engagement with Levinas—i.e., how can the other appear and be cared for in a face-to-face encounter? Against the background of the dialogue between Levinas, Derrida, and other thinkers, this dissertation examines three issues in Lawrence’s fiction—i.e., language, love, and sexual difference—which are profoundly relevant to Lawrence’s rejection of reducing the other to the Same, and hence might be explored to show the latent dangers as well as the ethical force in treating the other as absolutely different. In Part One, the attempt is to investigate the vital contribution Lawrence can make to our rethinking of ethical questions in terms of language, by referring to the premise of the recent ethical turn of deconstruction that the ethical function of language is confirmed, rather than dissimulated, by the undecidability of reference. Focusing on the linguistic complexities in Lawrence’s fiction, I’ll argue that Lawrence’s fiction seeks not only to offer an ethics of fiction, but to expose the fictional nature of ethics through otherness in language, with the referential and self-referential power of literary text existing in a dynamic and creative relationship. Part Two traces Lawrence’s attempt to seek for new ways to speak about love by comparing his conception of love with that of Levinas. Love is for them the ethical relation to alterity because it avoids the fusion of the Other with the Same. Lawrence’s formulation of “star-equilibrium” refers to the kind of love based on recognition and respect of intrinsic otherness. Yet, given that to have an ethical relation to absolute alterity is itself paradoxical, I’ll show that Lawrence treats the articulation of “star-equilibrium” not as an ideal structure of love but as a highly problematic possibility. Part Three looks into an ethics of sexual difference in Lawrence’s fiction by drawing upon the dialogue between Levinas and some feminist critics and by referring to the dialectic between ethics and politics proposed by some poststructuralist thinkers. I’ll maintain that, while Lawrence urgently insists on the incomparability between different sexed beings, sexual difference is for him not an unbridgeable gap, but a way to fertilize the distance and difference between sexes and the precondition for the pursuit of a world of justice. As the ethical reading provided by this study has revealed, Lawrence’s fiction is both a manifestation and a critique of the notion of absolute alterity. Therefore, this study is neither an application of a set of rules to Lawrence’s fiction, nor an occasional use of literature to prove a theory. In fact, Lawrence’s notion of “untranslatability” differs strikingly from postmodern conception of alterity. Lawrence surely does not belong to the vein of postmodern ethics because he never accords the other the priority as Levinas does—while Lawrence is chiefly concerned with how to flourish the self through an encounter with the truly other, Levinas is obsessed with how the self is infinitely obligated to respond to the call of the other. A reading of Lawrence’s fiction through an engagement with the thinkers of ethical alterity manifests that even the most secure ego cannot efface the other’s alterity when being faced with the other’s foreignness, even the most vulnerable and attentive ego is autonomous as a result when caring for the other, and even the most patient and non-violent reading cannot avoid reducing the literary text to a form of comprehension. For all that, their critique of violence in mental knowledge and self-consciousness and their rethinking of possibility and impossibility bring forth an ethical opening in intellectual culture and intersubjective relations, even though violence is inevitable and continues all along.