從「心之知覺」論朱子之「心」的道德動能——從「知覺是智之事」談起

Abstract

關於朱子（名熹，1130－1200）理氣論、心性論與工夫論的詮解，自牟宗三先生（1909－1995）判朱子思想型態為「別子為宗」、「他律道德」之後，迄今仍是學界爭論的議題。此中主要由於朱子以理氣概念來說心性，因此牟先生指出朱子所言之「心」為一形而下的氣心，不能作為道德主體。本文從朱子原典文獻中，舉出朱子批謝上蔡（名良佐，1050～1103）「以覺言仁」的言論、朱子論「人心、道心」言論、論喜怒哀樂未發時之心的狀態，以及其「智藏」思想等相關資料，深入析解，論證朱子「心之知覺（虛靈明覺）」具有道德動能之義，並立基於原典文獻的基礎上，對朱子「心之知覺」的相關言論進行同情的解析與脈絡的連類，期能提出朱子心論的另一種詮解進路。

Regarding the interpretation of Li-Qì theory, Xin-Xing theory, Gong-Fu theory of Master Zhu (Zhu Xi, 1130-1200), it is still an argument in academic circles, ever since Mou, Zong-san has classified the thinking of Master Zhu as “Bei-Zi-Wei-Zong”, “Ta-Lu-Dao-De”. This is mainly due to Master Zhu uses Li-Qì theory to explain moral mind, so that Mou, Zong-san thinks that the mind that Master Zhu said is a (Metaphysical) mind of Chi and can't be the morality subject itself. These years, within the circles of university no one but professor Zhu, Han-yang ever cited Master Zhu’s “Li-Yu-Chi-He” to question Mou, Zong-san explanation. In this article, the author digs further into the related original literary documents and finds out that Master Zhu ever criticized the remarks of “Yi-Jiao-Yan-Ren” of Shang, Cai -Hsieh and he alsoever explained his “Ren-Xin, Dao-Hsin” and “Xi-Nu-Ai-Le” (the four types of human emotions state) before they are expressed explicitly to demonstrate that Master Chu did think “Ethereal Consciousness” has its moral agency, this is utterly different from Mou, Zong-san “Dao-De-Yi-Jian-Sha” (reducing the morality meaning), viewpoint. In a word, the author aims at clarifying and restoring what Master Chu has conveyed in his original literary documents and hopes it is not misinterpreted.