馬歇爾與戰後美國對華政策（1945-1949）

Abstract

1945年抗戰勝利以後，和平並没有降臨中國，隨之而來的是國共就搶佔日佔區而開展的衝突。雖則國共兩黨曾在時任美國駐華大使赫爾利的促成下達成「雙十協定」，然而兩黨並没有因此停止敵對，雙方的衝突更有越演越烈之勢。美國研判國共雙方的衝突將使中國陥入內戰，不利於美國對華政策的開展，故美國決心以發揮政治力量的方法全面干預中國內戰。適逢赫爾利因對美國對華政策之不滿而大肆抨擊美國政府，致使美國政府之對華政策淪為朝野攻擊之對象，美國總統杜魯門遂決定派遣德高望重之馬歇爾出使中國，調處中國內戰。馬歇爾於1946年12月出使中國，並於1947年1月返美。此一年之使華調處，可分為前後兩期，兩期又以1946年3月馬歇爾回美述職作為分水嶺。馬歇爾使華調處之前期，是為其使華調處之「蜜月期」，分別促成了停戰令、軍事調處執行部以及整軍協議。然而馬歇爾卻並未處理國共之間的深層次矛盾，致使其返美述職期間，國共雙方終因爭奪東北而大打出手。馬歇爾自美國返回後，調處日漸艱困，一方面是蔣介石決心武力剿共﹐另一方面則是中共因獲得蘇聯之暗助而得以進入東北發展，國共雙方各有盤算，互不相讓。蔣介石欺瞞馬歇爾前往瀋陽督師，進攻長春的舉動更是成為馬歇爾與國府及蔣介石決裂的根源。及後縱有司徒雷登襄助，馬歇爾的調處仍未見起色，調處陷入停滯。馬歇爾深知已無法調處，故轉向鼓勵中國第三方勢力人士積極參政，讓中國人為自己國家負責，並致力於確保1946年憲法之通過。1947年1月，馬歇爾結束其使華任務返美，旋即接任國務卿一職。馬歇爾因其在中國調處的經驗，已對國府的管治能力失去信心，故有意逐步將美國勢力退出中國。適逢共產主義席捲歐洲，美國得以重新審視其全球戰略佈局，在全新的戰略思維下，中國的戰略重要性被大幅調低。在范宣德及肯楠的提議下，馬歇爾決意採取「重歐輕亞、扶植日本」的全新外交思維，棄守中國。1947年魏德邁之使華及1948年援華法案之通過，均是馬歇爾受外在壓力下的無奈之舉，馬歇爾消極、棄守中國的對華立場始終未變。

After the victory at the end of World War II in 1945, peace did not come to China, following by conflicts between the Chinese Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party for former Japanese occupied areas. Although the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party reached the"Double Tenth Agreement" from the U.S. Ambassador Hurley’s intervention, the two parties did not cease their hostility and conflicts between two parties became even more intense. The U.S. is determined to intervene in China's civil war by exerting its political power, because they believed those conflicts between the Communist Party and Chinese Kuomintang will lead China into a civil war, which is detrimental to the development of U.S. Policy Toward China. When Hurley's dissatisfaction with theU.S. Policy Toward China led him to criticize the U.S. government, making the U.S. government's policy toward China became the target of attacks from both sides of ruling parties and oppositions. As a result, President Harry S. Truman decided to send the highly respected George Catlett Marshall to China in order to mediate in the Chinese civil war. Marshall went to China in December 1946 and returned to the U.S. in January 1947. This year's deployment to China can be divided into two phases, with Marshall's return to the U.S. in March 1946 as the watershed. The first period of Marshall's mission to China was the "honeymoon period", which led to the Cessation of Hostilities Order, The Executive Headquarters Peiping and the Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces into the Nation Army. However, Marshall failed to address the deep-rooted conflict between the Chinese Kuomintang and the Communist Party, which led to a big fight between the Chinese Kuomintang and the Communist Party over the Manchuria during his return to the U.S. at March 1946. After Marshall's return from the U.S., the situation became increasingly difficult, partly because of Chiang Kai-shek's determination to suppress the Communists by force, and partly because of the Chinese Communists were able to enter the Manchuria with the secret help supported by the Soviet Union. The two sides had their own plans and did not give way to each other. Chiang Kai-shek deceived Marshall into going to Shenyang to supervise and attack Changchun, which broke down the relationship between Marshall,the Republic of China (ROC) government and Chiang Kai-shek. Even with the help of John Leighton Stuart, Marshall's mediation failed to show any improvement and it came to a standstill. Marshall came to his senses that he could no longer mediate, he then turned to encourage third parties in China to take an active part in politics. On the other hand, Marshall also believed that Chinese are responsible for their own country. The final job of Marshall in China is to secure the passage of the 1946 Constitution. In January 1947, Marshall returned to the U.S. from his mission to China and immediately assumed the position of Secretary of State. Due to his experience in China, Marshall had lost his confidence in the ROC government's ability to govern, therefore intended to gradually withdraw U.S. influence from China. As communism swept through Europe, the U.S. was able to re-examine its global strategic layout and under a new strategic mindset, the strategic significance of China was substantially downgraded. At the suggestion of John Carter Vincent and George Frost Kennan, Marshall decided to adopt a novel diplomatic mindset of "emphasizing Europe over Asia and supporting Japan" and abandoned China. Wedemeyer's missionto China in 1947 and the passage of China Aid Act of 1948 were both reluctant moves made by Marshall under external pressure while Marshall's position on China with passive attitude and abandonment remained unchanged.