Aristotle式的習慣養成概念及其品格教育蘊義

Abstract

本研究旨在探究Aristotle式的習慣養成概念，並據以提出對品格教育的蘊義。本文採用概念分析與哲學論證方法，以Aristotle倫理學中的核心思想出發，探討其習慣養成概念以及當代學者的重要論述，並分析道德教育的弔詭、實踐智慧等與習慣養成相關的關鍵概念。最後，破除常見的三項迷思，包括《教育部品德教育促進方案》中未明見習慣養成作為教學方法、習慣養成與理性思辨間的對立關係，以及習慣養成僅限於兒童期。研究發現有四：首先，Aristotle式的習慣養成旨在培養道德德行，協助學習者認識道德事實，感受適當的苦與樂，並且付諸行動，而此過程必須經由指導者的啟導以及實踐練習。第二，當代學者對習慣養成採取的觀點主要分為機械論與認知論，前者將Aristotle式的習慣養成詮釋為經由機械的、無心的制約方式進行，而後者則肯定個體親身投入於道德學習活動中認知的不可或缺性。第三，習慣養成至理性／實踐智慧之間過渡的關係是順暢、平穩的，而非跳躍的，因為品格教育中培養的習慣屬於多軌的、開放式的，具有因應情境個殊性而有多變性、可調整的特徵，且習慣養成與實踐智慧間的緊密與相輔相成關係，藉由習慣養成可以使學習者順利過渡至實踐智慧。第四，習慣養成不僅能作為學校推動品格教育之有效方法，更係個體陶養品格之終身適用方法。透過澄清Aristotle式的習慣養成概念，研究者指出，習慣養成並非如人們以為那般，以養成學習者的外顯行為模式及生活常規為目標，而是能夠作為協助實現我國當前十二年國民基本教育中「道德實踐與公民意識」核心素養的一項重要品格教育方法，得以培養知善、樂善與行善的道德主體。This thesis explores Aristotle's concept of habituation and proposes its implications for character education. Conceptual analysis and philosophical argumentation methods are used to examine Aristotle’s concept of habituation and to analyse the important discourse of contemporary scholars that has been based on his core ideas on ethics. Key concepts related to habituation, such as the paradox of moral education and practical wisdom, are also analysed. Finally, three common misconceptions are re-considered: that habituation is not included as a teaching method in Ministry of Education's Guidelines for Facilitating Character and/or Moral Education Programs; that habituation and rational speculation are in an opposing relationship; and that habituation is only relevant to childhood. This thesis indicates that, first, the aim of Aristotelian habituation is to cultivate moral virtue and to help learners recognise the fact, feel appropriate pleasure and pain, and turn to action. This process must be initiated by a tutor and practised. Second, the important discourse of contemporary scholars on habituation can mainly be categorised into two camps: mechanical and cognitive. In the mechanical camp, Aristotelian habituation is interpreted as being conducted through mechanical, mindless conditioning, whereas in the cognitive camp, individuals are affirmed as being personally involved in activities in which morals are learnt, meaning that cognitive capacities are indispensable to habituation. Third, the transition between habituation and reason or practical wisdom is smooth rather than incoherent because the concept of habits cultivated during character education is multi-track and open-ended, possessing variability and adaptability in response to each particular case, and the interweaving and complementary relationship between habituation and practical wisdom enables learners to transition smoothly to practical wisdom through habituation. Fourth, habituation is not only an effective method for promoting character education in schools but also a lifelong means of nurturing an individual's character. By clarifying the concept of Aristotelian habituation, this thesis suggests that habituation is not simply the process of cultivating the external behavioural patterns and routines of learners but is also a crucial method of character education. Habituation can assist in attaining the core literacy of 'moral praxis and citizenship' in students going through Taiwan's current 12-Year Basic Education Curriculum, cultivating their moral agency to know the good, appreciate the good, and do the good.