善的至高性與脆弱性:Murdoch與Nussbaum的立場及其德育蘊義

Abstract

面對當前倫理困境與道德教育問題，傳統道德哲學總不免會獨斷地認定「善」只能有一種普世定義，而激進後現代卻是不給「善」的觀點任何討論的餘地，兩者顯然同樣忽略有關「善自身」的超越性特質，以及人之所以能覺察「善」的心理哲學問題。有鑑於此，本文將分析兩種「善」的觀點及其道德教學方法之具體主張。就前者而言，英國著名文學家暨哲學家Murdoch無疑是柏拉圖主義的重要代表人物，她認為「善」由於擁有諸如「完美」的「超越性」特質，故具備「至高性J '也唯有藉由「美學觀照」方法才能掌握「完美善」之特質。就後者而言， Nussbaum做為一個新亞里斯多德主義者，她則是藉由希臘悲劇與哲學中的道德運氣問題來論證「善」的「脆弱性」特質，故應強化「敘事想像」能力以體現「具同情心之公民素養」。就倫理觀比較而言，若將「善的至高性」視為一種堅定的道德情操，這當然是一種擇善固執的態度，而將對「善的脆弱性」看成「透過實踐來追求幸福人生」之倫理行動，這個行動不只是獨善其身，更是具有促進社會正義之積極性。本文認為，兩種「善」的觀點看似矛盾，實則應為一種互補或共存之關係'這種整全的倫理觀點應可對當代倫理問題提供更妥適的實踐基礎。

With regard to contemporary ethical plights and the possibility of problems in moral education, the most serious issue within traditional moral philosophy is its dogmatic universal idea of “goodness." In contrast to this extreme, the predicament of radical postmodem ethics is its naive romantic-relative idea of “goodness," which is itself another extreme. Both of the ideas of “goodness" neglect the transcendent character of “goodness in and of itself' and the philosophical and psychological issue of “awareness of goodness." Unlike these two extreme points of orientation, this article analyzes two perspectives on what “goodness" is and how it is embodied in moral education methods. The first perspective analyzed is that of Iris Murdoch, a Britishlitterateur, philosopher, and scholar of Platonism. Murdoch believes “ sovereign good" is “transcendent" and can be embodied through her moral method of “aesthetical attention." Martha Nussbaum, a scholar of neo-Aristotelian philosophy, espouses a second viewpoint. She argues that dilemmas of moral luck as il1ustrated in Greektragedy demonstrate “ the fragility of goodness," and emphasizes (Does the verb“emphasizes" belong with “Nussbaum" as in “she emphasizes" OR is the author trying to say “the dilemmas of moral luck... demonstrate..., and emphasize...") the importance of “ cultivating compassionate citizenship" as addressed by her moral method of“ narrative imagination." From these two different moral viewpoints, the pursuit of“sovereign good" is likened to going on a pilgrimage, meaning that people should choose what is good and hold fast to it. On the other hand, recognizing “the fragility of goodness" and taking it as an foundation for action in the pursuit of happiness this is not an individual moral action, but an action for fostering social justice. The researcher suggests that, ifwe could agree that the relationship between these two ideas of goodness is not mutual1y absolute or contradictory, and that the two notio